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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
--ooOoo-SPENCER AUTO SALES, INC.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 10942

.,'

vs.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,

Defendant-Appellant.
--ooOoo-Appeal from a Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff
granted by the Fourth District Court in and for
Wasatch County, Allen B. Sorenson, Judge, Presiding.
--ooOoo-NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by automobile

deale~

Respondent SPENCER AUTO SALES, INC., to collect·'
in excess of $12,000 held by Appellant FIRST
SECURITY BANK in a reserve account pertaining
to conditional sales contracts sold to the Bank
by the Dealer pursuant to a Dealer's Reserve

Agreement.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The Fourth Judicial District Court,

Allen B. Sorenson, Judge, granted Plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment after a hearing on
the matter and judgment in favor of PlaintiffRespondent was subsequently entered against
Defendent-Appellant on May 1, 1967, in the
amount of $12,254.07 with interest.

A second

hearing reconsidering the motion resulted in
no change of the decision.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the District Court and instruction that
judgment for Defendent-Appellant be entered,
or in the alternative, remanded for further
proceedings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The undisputed relevant facts commence
in time on July 29, 1965, when the parties
entered into an "Auto Dealer Protection and
Reserve Agreement" (referred to hereinafter as
"Reserve Agreement," and shown twice at R. 1011 and R. 43, Exhibit 2).

Pursuant to the

Reserve Agreement Appellant Bank regularly
purchased retail conditional sales contracts
from Respondent Dealer until May, 1966, (R. 31,:

.,'

lines 7-12) , and one additional contract was

purchased in July, 1966, (R. 34, lines 21-28).,
It had originally been thought that the Reserv
Agreement specifically made the subject of thi
action was in effect until October 21, 1966
(R. 7) , but this date was subsequently clarified to the May date in the deposition of Byro
Cheever (R. 28-31) , and by additional correspondence between counsel which is not in the
record.
During the regular course of busines
the Bank paid the Dealer the face amount of

each contract purchased less an amount of dis-'
count previously agreed upon, which amount
was placed in a "Reserve" account held by the
Bank as security for the Dealer's recourse
guaranty and other obligations provided in the
Reserve Agreement.

While the parties were thu.

doing business and the Dealer was not in defau
in any manner, the Bank paid the Dealer, at th
end of each quarter, the funds in the reserve
account in excess of five percent (5%) of the
aggregate outstanding contracts held by the
Bank under the Agreement.

A "special" reserve

account was also established for specific
problematical contracts but is not in issue
here.

After May, 1966, when the Dealer

took its business elsewhere, the Bank continued to hold all accumulated reserves becau:
of the substantial volume of contracts still

.:

outstanding.
On August 5, 1966, the Dealer wrote
a letter presumably constituting a demand for
the amount of reserves exceeding five percent
(5%)

(R. 43, Exhibit 1) .and on January 9,

1967, a more formal demand for the reserves
was made (R. 43, Exhibit 4).

Shortly prior

to the first demand, at the period ending
June 20, 1966, the Bank held reserves in the
amount of $24,236.71, constituting 7.6% of
the outstanding retail contracts of $319,025.·
(R. 43, Exhibit 5).

Shortly prior to the

January demand, at the period ending November
1966, the reserve amounted to $19,730.06 constituting 9.07% of the outstanding retail
contracts of $206,422.93 (R. 43, Exhibit 6).
Subsequent to filing the present action, and
at the period ending March 20, 1967, the rese:
amountAd to $18.908.22, constituting 13.404%

of the outstanding retail contracts totaling
$141,067.23 (R. 43, Exhibit 7).

By this

action Plaintiff-Respondent seeks recovery
of all amounts in the

gene~al

reserve account

exceeding five percent (5%) of the outstanding,:
balances of the retail c::?ntracts, with interes·:
from the respective dates of demand.
Notwithstanding the Dealer's actions
terminating the business relationship as of
May, 1966, and at least no later than July,
1966, the Reserve Agreement was not formally
terminated by the Bank until this litigation
was pending and on April 11, 1967, (R. 15).
The entire dispute of the parties involves
interpretation of the Reserve Agreement and
specifically paragraph 4. thereof.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ITS CONTRAC

TUAL INTERPRETATION REQUIRING REFUND OF THE
EXCESS RESERVES.
In the interest of clear exposition
of issues to be decided on appeal Appellant
moves at the outset to consideration of legal
questions arising from the contractual provi-

-6-

sions.

Paragraph 4. provides in pertinent

part:
***The Dealer's Reserve Account is
hereby assigned and pledged to the
Bank and shall be held and controlled
by the Bank as a continuing security,
for all of the Dealer's obligations
to, and agreements with, the Bank,
now or hereafter existing, absolute
or contingent. ***When and if this
agreement is terminated, and when
all of the Dealer's direct and contingent obligations to the Bank
shall have been paid, satisfied and
discharged, the balance then remaining in the Dealer's Reserve Account
shall be released to the Dealer by
the Bank. On the last day of March,
June, September, and December the
Bank, on written demand of the
Dealer, and if at such time the
Dealer is not in default on any of
the Dealer's obligations to the
Bank and this Agreement is still in
effect, shall release to the Dealer
out of the Dealer's Reserve Account,
the amount by which the credit balance in the Dealer's Reserve Account
shall, at the date of payment, exceed
five percent of the total balances
then unpaid on the Dealer's Contracts
held by the Bank under this Agreement.
(Emphasis supplied)
(R. 10 and R. 43,
Exhibit 2)
The final paragraph on Page 2 of the
Agreement provides:
This agreement may be terminated
at any time by either par~y upon
notice to the other, provided,
however, that such termination .
shall not affect any contract discounted under this agreement.

Analysis of most of the quoted
provisions is fairly simple.

The reserve

account is held as continuing security for
all of the Dealer's obligations, both absolute
and contingent.

The Bank is clearly obligated,:'

however, to refund quarterly all reserve funds:
exceeding five percent (5%) of the aggregate
outstanding contracts, not on the capricious
whim of the Bank, but on the existence of
two conditions precedent:

i!

(1) the Dealer

is not in default on any obligations to the
Bank, and (2) the Agreement is still in
effect.

It was conceded that at least as of

April 7, 1967, Respondent Dealer was not
in default on any obligations to the Bank

(R. 26, lines 5-12).

But the real question

in this entire litigation is whether the
Agreement is still in effect, for the purposes
of that last sentence of paragraph 4.
The Agreement clearly would not be
in effect if, as specifically provided in the
middle of paragraph 4., all of the Dealer's
absolute and contingent obligations were paid

.

1•

and discharged.

This means that no further

contracts are outstanding and Dealer has
fully performed what it was obligated to
perform.

In such a circumstance the Dealer

receives back all of the reserve account and
not only that exceeding five percent (5%).
The Agreement clearly would not be
in effect if either party served a written
and formal notice of termination of contract.
Appellant Bank, out of prudence and a desire
to eliminate any further question about future
demands by Respondent Dealer, gave such formal
notice April ll, 1967. (R. 15)

tance for this Court to consider, however, is
the reservation in the last sentence of the
Agreement that even if notice of termination
has been given the Agreement still controls
as to any contracts remaining outstanding.
The only effect of a notice of termination,
therefore, is an announcement that the Dealer
will not sell further contracts to the Bank,
or, in the event of notice from the Bank, that
the Bank will not purchase further contracts
submitted.

1

Of prime impor-

This puts the parties in the

unique status of having no further business

relationship because the contract is terminatec
but its provisions still govern with respect
to remaining outstanding contracts.

If an

automobile purchaser defaults in monthly payments the Bank may repossess the vehicle and
require the Dealer to buy back the entire
contract under the provisions of paragraph 5.
That very provision constitutes the basis of
the Dealer's contingent obligations to the
Bank.

Until such contingent obligations are

discharged by payment of all contracts outstanding the Bank may hold the entire reserve
account as security for all absolute or
contingent liabilities of the Dealer and is
not obligated to pay the reserves down to the
five percent (5%) figure because one of the
conditions precedent for such obligation is
not fulfilled, to-wit:
11

still in ef feet.

the Agreement is not

11

Appellant submits that it requires
no stretch of either legal reasoning or
language interpretation to say that the Agreement is not "in effect" for the purposes of
doing business, but yet governs while any

contracts remain outstanding with the Bank.

It exists for one purpose, but not for another

Indeed, such construction is absolutely necessary if the phrase "Agreement is still in
effect" has any meaning whatever.
be reduced to this

simp~e thr~~

It can

stage anafysis

~

(a) If the parties are doing business and
Dealer is not in default he is clearly deserving of the reserves down to the five
percent (5%) figure; (b) If the parties are
no longer doing business, the contracts are
fully paid and the Dealer is not in default,

the Dealer is paid all:of the reserve account:
(c) If the parties are no longer doing
business, but contracts yet remain

outstandin~

then the Agreement is not "in effect" but
the Bank is entitled to hold the entire
reserve account as security for Dealer's
contingent liabilities.

Only in this "middle

ground" between the status of fully paid contracts and the status of a fully operative
relationship does the phrase "if this Agreement is still in effect" have any meaning,
for the Dealer receives all his money in the

-11-

first instance, receives down to the five
percent (5%) figure in the second instance,
but receives nothing in the last instance, whic
is this present case.
Examination of the record brings a
ready answer to the rhetorical question:

"On

what ground does the Bank claim the Agreement
is no longer in effect?"

We base that asser-

tion on the simple fact that Respondent Dealer

1-'

unilaterally and voluntarily and without cause
told the Bank in May, 1966, that it was think- :
ing of taking its business elsewhere, and

exce1~

for one July contract purchase, actually did
just that.
line 12)

(R. 29, line 1, through R. 31,
Appellant submits that the threat

of discontinuing an established business patte1
followed shortly by the actual discontinuance,,
constitutes notice of termination of the contr<
just as effectively as if a formal document ha<
been served.

In this connection reference is .

again made to the last paragraph of the: Agree-!
ment allowing termination by "either party upo1
notice to the other. 11

No particular form of n<r

is required.

It may be oral or written.

(We observe that when the contract requires
written notice it so specifies, as in the
case of the Dealer's demand for quarterly
release of the reserves under paragraph 4.)
What notice can be more effective, even if
not lawyer-like formally documented, than
for Mr. Spencer to tell the Bank he was no
longer going to do business and then fulfill
his promise or carry out his threat, as the
case may be, by his objective behavior?
No doubt can exist for this Court that as
a result of Respondent Dealer's actions the
Agreement was not "in effect" and Appellant
Bank was not obligated to release the reserves
exceeding the five percent (5%) figure.
Because of the necessity of interpreting the contract specifically at issue
in this case abundant citation of cases does
not prove helpful.

A few judicial decisions

and the reasoning thereof, though not strictly
apposite, may nevertheless serve to sustain
our conclusions by analagous precedent and
l

•

to illumine the "fairness" of the Bank s posi-

tion in what might, at first glance, seem
a harsh manner of treating a former customer.
In Associate Discount Corp. vs. Goetzinger
(Iowa 1954) 62 N.W. 2d 191, the dealer,
Mickel, sold contracts for face value less
a holdback ref erred to as "commission,

11

repayable by the financing institution after
each contract was fully paid.

Though

principally concerned with a question of holde:
in due course the following is very meaningful:
Mickel's commission on loans was
not payable until 'these contracts
were paid out.' It is a fair inference one reason for witholding
the commission on each loan was to
insure Mickers continued interest
and cooperation in connection with
such loan. {62 N.W. 2d, 193)
Similarly, in Mutual Finance Co.
v. Martin (Fla. 1953) 63 So. 2d 649, it was
stated that the amount held back from the contract purchase price upon assignment from the
dealer to the financing institution.is "to
protect the finance company against loss on t'b
note" (63 so. 2d, 653).

It is otherwise

phrased in Schuck v. Murdock Acceptance Corp.
(Ark. 1952) 247

s. w. 2d 1, where "The agree-;

ments for reserve, and for the so-called rese1

1

were according to a pattern of intent showing
mutuality of interests" (247

s. w. 2d, 5).

Such policy considerations are vital in viewing the status between First Security Bank
and Spencer Auto Sales in the case at bar.
A mutuality of interest existed while the

parties were operating harmoniously, for one
party wanted the other to buy contracts, the
other wanted to buy and also wanted to insure
the first party's continued interest and cooper'
ation in connection with each contract.

Under

such circumstances a reserve of only five
percent (5%) of the aggregate outstanding
contracts was sufficient to protect the Bank.
But after the Dealer takes it upon himself to
terminate the relationship the attitudes
change, for then each party wants to look
out for his own interests and no longer desires
to maintain the mutuality of interests or
"continuing-business" oriented kind of behavior;
From the viewpoint of the Bank its possibility
of loss is considerably increased by the loss
of friendly cooperation of the Dealer.

In

the event of default by a contract debtor
the Dealer has none of the former psychological motivation to repurchase the contract
and maintain harmony with the Bank, for the
Dealer knows the Bank has the reserves to covex
his obligations so why should he take any
money out of his own pocket just to abide
by an Agreement no longer in effect?

To

charge the reserve account for the repurchase
commitments would be so natural a request by
the Dealer that the Bank should be entitlErlto
hold more funds than before.

In the instant

case Appellant Bank held contracts totaling
$141,067.23 as late as March 20, 1967 (R. 43,
Exhibit 7) , and three days later at least
twenty-two (22) contracts out of the 127 outstanding were past due, some of them for· a
considerable length of time (R. 43, Exhibit 8).
In view of the possible lack of continued
cooperation of the Dealer, the Court cannot
say that the Bank is being unreasonably
Protected or has an excess of consideration
for its increased risks by retaining the entire

reserve account until all contracts are fully
paid.

Precisely this kind of risk on contin-

gent liabilities of the Dealer is envisioned
by the Reserve Agreement and the conditions
precedent to the Bank's obligation to release
any reserves.

And if the present Agreement is

not worded quite as artfully as we would hope
it will be changed for future transactions,
but even in its present state the language
is clear enough, as applied to the facts of
the case, to justify this Court in reversing
the judgment of the Court below.
The strength of a reserve account
as a separate source of security is shown
when a financing institution can be deemed
a holder in due course of the assigned

contrac~

even when it retains a five percent (5%) reserve for losses.

Implement Credit Corp. v.

Elsinger (1954) 208 Wis. 143, 66 N. W. 2d 657.
And more convincingly, the purpose and integri·
of a dealer's reserve is manifest in Tallant v
Hamilton (Mo. 1966) 406

s. w.

2d 599.

In

that case· the dealer discontinued doing busine,
with the financing agency and subsequently sue

1

for the reserves which had been held back from

the contract purchase price during the period
of assigning contracts in the ordinary course
of business.

The Court held that since the

reserve account was for the purpose of protect-·
ing the financer from credit losses, it was
entitled to the full amount in the reserve
account up to the amount of its notes from
the dealer, less the value of money or property actually received by it from the dealer,
as adjusted by costs of repossession of the
vehicles.

That case arose at a point in the

dissolved relationship which was further "down
the road" than the case at bar.

But the reserv

account can and must be maintained by Appellant
Bank for the manifest purpose of protecting
it against possible losses of the nature
actually suffered in the cited cases.

With

twenty-two (22) out of 127 contracts (17.3%)
past due as of March 23, 1967, and thus
subject to possible repurchase demand against
the Dealer, it is not at all unreasonable that
the Bank should continue to hold reserves
amounting to 13.404% of the outstanding contrac

(R. 43, Exhibits 7 and 8).

It is thus sub-

mitted that both the wording of the Agreement
and a fairly inferred policy behind the Agreement compel this Court to reverse the decision
of the lower Court.
In referring to the first Memorandum
Decision of the lower Court (R. 45) it should
be noted that we are not urging, nor does any
need exist therefor, any express or implied
stipulation in the Agreement amending the
last sentence of paragraph 4.

What Appellant

urges does not amend but specifically gives
meaning to that sentence and the entire Agreement in which it finds its setting.

POINT II:

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER IN

VIEW OF UNRESOLVED FACTUAL ISSUES
The arguments set forth above, resting primarily on the contract wording, are
deemed sufficient legal basis for reversing
the lower Court's judgment.

If This Court

does not adopt Appellant's attempts to give
meaning to the words "if this Agreement is
still in effect," in the context of the support

I~
,'·

: I.I

J

ing facts in the record showing effective
termination, such decision can be based only
on the assumption that the Agreement was still
in effect when demands for the excess reserves
were made by Respondent.

For either the Agree-

ment continued in effect and the Bank was
rendered obligated thereby to release reserves
down to the five percent figure, or the Agreement was not in effect and the Bank was therer
relieved of such obligation until all contracts
were paid off.
possible.

No alternative positions are

And if the Agreement were deemed to

have continued in effect, contrary to the legal
arguments under Point I, then the record of
this case must be shown to contain factual
issues bearing thereon which render Summary
Judgment completely inappropriate.

This Court

too well understands, to eliminate any need
for extensive citations, the provisions of
Rule 56 (c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to
the effect that summary Judgment can be grantee
only when no material issue of fact exists and
a party is entitled to judgment as a matter _of

-law.

At the first hearing on RespJndent's

Motion for Summary Judgment the factual issue
of termination was argued by Appellant.• s
counsel to be the only issue for decision.
For what was intended when Respondent's Mr.

Spencer advised the Bank that he "had seriously
considered changing his financing connection"?

(R. 30, lines 26-28)

And when Mr. Spencer

actually did make a change, and discontinued
selling contracts to First Security, did he
intend to terminate the relationship with
First Security or was he merely opening up
another line of financing with the hope of
using both financing institutions as outlets
for his retail paper, as is often done by
dealers?

{R. 33, lines 7-11)

We don't have

Mr. Spencer's story in the record, other than
his affidavit that his company was not in
default.

{R. 6)

Although the record is clear

that Mr. Spencer threatened to leave First
Security on May 20, 1966, {R. 29, line 20),
and only one contract was purchased by the
Bank as late as July, 1966, {R. 34, lines 2128) yet were those circumstances sufficient
to constitute notice to First Security that

Spencer was terminating the Reserve Agreement prior to his demand letter of August
1966 (R. 43, Exhibit l)?

s,

And when the Bank's

Mr. Cheever describes tlematter as a series
of events leading up to his conclusion that

Spencer was through doing business with the
Bank, and that this had certainly become clear
by October 21, 1966, (R. 34, line 15, through
35, line 14,) is there room to believe that

the parties had a fully effective Agreement

at the time of the August 5th demand by Spencer.
but had no such Agreement by the time of the
next demand in January, 1967?

The answers

to these questions would be largely factual
determinations bearing on the effectiveness
and timing of the termination of the Reserve
Agreement, if any.

And with such issues in the

record the summary Judgment was completely out
of order.

Thus an effective alternative ground

is presented for reversing, and in this event
remanding the case for further proceedings.

--

..............

-22c_~~------

CONCLUSION

Appellant submits that the better reasoning
leads to the inescapable conclusion that the
undisputed facts evidence an effective termination of the Reserve Agreement by actions of
Respondent, thus relieving Appellant of any
obligation to release reserves from the account.
The Judgment should be reversed with directions
to enter Judgment for Defendant-Appellant.
If the facts in the record cannot be f airl
construed to support the termination theory,
at least an issue of fact is :r:aised thereby whic
requires reversal of the Judgment and remand for
further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

